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Web Appendix
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Appendices
Proof of Proposition 1
We prove our characterization result for a broader class of payos than those in the
baseline specication of Section II. We allow the payos for investing to be of the following
form
(A1) ug(a; ) =
(
ug(a; ) if a  1  ;
ug(a; ) if a < 1  :
Payo for not investing is 0 as before. The information structure is unaltered.
We will divide the proof into three parts. Lemma 6 proves equilibrium existence and
uniqueness, Lemma 7 establishes convergence of equilibrium as  ! 0, and Proposition 3
provides the characterization of the limit equilibrium. The lemmas are proved under an
increasing set of assumptions specied below.
A1. Preliminaries
We rescale the function of the aggregate action as follows: ~a(;) =
P
g wgmg (1  Fg (g   ));
when xg = x1 + g and  = x1 +  then the aggregate action a^(;x) = ~a(;). For
a 2 (0; 1), we let #(a;) be the inverse function to ~a(;) with respect to . It is well
dened and increasing in a because ~a(;) is increasing in  when ~a(;) 2 (0; 1).
The strategic beliefs can be written as
(A2) Ag(a;) = Pr (~a (g   g;) < a) , where g  Fg:
Lemma 4. For any , the densities associated with the strategic beliefs are bounded:
0  @@aAg(a;)  1=(wgmg).
Proof of Lemma 4. Using (A2), we can write Ag(a;) = 1   Fg(g   #(a;)). Dier-
entiating gives
@
@a
Ag(a;) = fg(g   #(a;)) @
@a
#(a;) =
fg(g   #(a;))P
g0 wg0mg0fg0(g0   #(a;))
:
1
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The last expression lies in [0; 1=wgmg] because fg0() is non-negative for all g0 and positive
for some g0 when 0 < a < 1.
Finally, we introduce notation for the payo expectation of the threshold type from group
g:
Hg (x1;) = E

ug(a; )
 xg; g = Z 1
0
ug(a; x1 + #(a;))dAg(a;):
Functions Hg (x1;) are well dened even for  = 0 because the beliefs Ag(a;) are
independent of .
A2. Equilibrium Existence, Uniqueness, and Monotonicity
We prove equilibrium existence, uniqueness, and monotonicity under the following as-
sumptions:
Assumption 0: ug(a; ) is positive and ug(a; ) is negative.
Assumption 1: Both ug(a; ), and ug(a; ) are non-decreasing in both arguments.
Assumption 2: The dierence ug(a; )   ug(a; ) is bounded by positive constants; 0 <
b < ug(a; )  ug(a; ) < b.
Assumption 3:  ug(a; ) is bounded by positive constants; 0 < c <  ug(a; ) < c < b.
Assumption 1 implies that the incentive to invest, ug(a; ), is non-decreasing both in the
aggregate action and in the fundamental. Assumptions 2 and 3 imply that each player
strictly prefers to invest whenever she assigns probability exceeding p = c=b < 1 to success
(that is, to a  1   ) and she prefers not to invest whenever she assigns probability
less than p = c=b to success. Also, Assumptions 2 and 3 imply that the functions ug are
bounded. Notice that Assumptions 0-3 are satised in the baseline setup.
We rst establish that the system of indierence conditions does not have multiple solu-
tions. This holds even when  = 0, which will be useful in the analysis of the limit of the
equilibria, as  ! 0.
Lemma 5. If Assumptions 0-3 hold then for each  2 [0; 1], the system of indierence
conditions,
Hg (x1;) = 0 for all g;
has at most one solution x1(), ().
The proof adapts the translation argument from Frankel, Morris, and Pauzner (2003).
Proof of Lemma 5. Assume the existence of two distinct solutions (x1;) and (x
0
1;
0).
Using a translation of one of the solutions, we demonstrate a contradiction. We distinguish
two cases,  = 0, and  6= 0.
If  = 0 then x1 6= x01 and, without loss of generality, x1 < x01. Recalling  =
x1 + #(a;), we dene a
; a0 2 (0; 1) as the unique solutions of a = 1   x1   #(a;),
and a = 1   x01   #(a;), respectively.1 The project succeeds whenever a > a, or
1The solutions exist; otherwise the threshold type's payo expectation would be strictly positive or negative,
violating the indierence condition. The solution is unique because a+ #(a;) is strictly monotone in a.
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a > a0 under the rst and the second prole, respectively. Notice that a > a0, because
a+ #(a;) strictly increases in a and x1 < x
0
1.
Both proles satisfy the indierence conditions, so Hg (x
0
1;)   Hg (x1;) = 0. But,
for any a, the incentive to invest, ug(a; x
0
1 + #(a;)) under the prole (x
0
1;) is at least
as large as the incentive ug(a; x1 + #(a;)) under the prole (x1;), because x
0
1 > x1
and ug is non-decreasing. Furthermore, by Assumption 2, ug(a; x
0
1+#(a;)) ug(a; x1+
#(a;))  b for a 2 (a0; a). Thus
Hg (x
0
1;) Hg (x1;)  b
 
Ag(a
;) Ag(a0;)

:
This establishes a contradiction because Ag(a
;) Ag(a0;) > 0. The strict inequality
holds because a is in the interior of the support of Ag(a;), otherwise the critical type
would assign probability 0 or 1 to the success.
In the second case,  6= 0, and, without loss of generality, x1  x01. Choose h 2
argmaxg(
0
g  g), and let D = maxg(0g  g). Notice that D  0 because 01 1 = 0
by denition. Observe that 0h  0g  h  g for all g, and the inequality is strict for
at least one g because  6= 0. Letting ~x1 = x01 + D, we have
Hh (~x1;)  Hh (x1;) = 0;
because ~x1  x01  x1 and H is non-decreasing in the rst argument. We show for
contradiction that
(A3) Hh (~x1;) < H

h (x
0
1;
0) = 0:
Recall that Hh (~x1;) =
R 1
0 uh(a; ~x1+#(a;))dAh(a;). The substitution a = ~a(h 
;) gives
(A4) Hh (~x1;) =
Z 1=2
 1=2
uh (~a(h   ;); ~xh   ) dFh();
where ~xh = ~x1 + h. Similarly,
(A5) Hh (x
0
1;
0) =
Z 1=2
 1=2
uh
 
~a(0h   ;0); x0h   

dFh();
where x0h = x
0
1 + 
0
h.
To establish inequality (A3), we will use ~xh = x
0
h, and
(A6) ~a(0h   ;0)  ~a(h   ;) for all :
The equality ~xh = x
0
h holds because ~xh = x
0
1+ D+ h = x
0
1+ (
0
h h)+ h = x0h.
Inequality (A6) holds because, using the denition of the function ~a, (A6) can be rewritten
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as X
g
wgmg
 
1  Fg(0g  0h + )
 X
g
wgmg (1  Fg(g  h + )) :
This in turn holds because 0h  0g  h  g for all g.
Dene  as the unique solution of ~a(h   ;) = 1  (~xh   ), and 0 as the unique
solution of ~a(0h   ;0) = 1  (x0h   ). The equality ~xh = x0h, and the inequality (A6)
implies   0.
We can further strengthen the last inequality to the strict one,  < 0. Assume for
contradiction  = 0. Recall that there exists g such that 0h  0g > h  g because
0 6= . Then
wgmg
 
1  Fg(0g  0h + )

> wgmg (1  Fg(g  h + ))
because 0g 0h+ and g h+ must lie in the support of Fg, otherwise the critical
type of group g would assign probability 0 or 1 to success. This implies that inequality
(A6) is strict at , contradicting the assumption  = 0.
Using (A4) and (A5), the equality ~xh = x
0
h, and the inequality (A6), we get
Hh (x
0
1;
0) Hh (~x1;)  b
 
Fh
 
0
  Fh () > 0:
Lemma 5 implies equilibrium uniqueness within the class of monotone strategy proles.
The next lemma establishes that non-monotone equilibria do not exist. The proof is based
on a standard \infection" argument.
Lemma 6. If Assumptions 0-3 hold then the studied coordination game has a unique
Bayes-Nash equilibrium, in which each player follows a threshold strategy: ai (x; g) =(
1 if x  xg;
0 if x < xg:
Proof of Lemma 6. By Assumptions 2 and 3, a player strictly prefers to invest whenever
she assigns probability higher than p to the success of the project. Hence investing is
dominant for all types (x; g) with signal x > x0g = 1 + F
 1
g (p).
Let Ug(x;x
) = E [ug(a^(;x); )j (x; g)] be the expected payo for investing of type (x; g)
against the monotone strategy prole with thresholds x. Ug(x;x) is non-decreasing in
x, non-increasing in x, and continuous. For k  0, dene xk+1g to be the unique solution
of Ug(x;x
k) = 0. The sequence is well dened: the solution exists and is unique because
limx!+1 Ug(x;xk) is positive, limx! 1 Ug(x;xk) is negative, Ug is continuous and strictly
increasing in x at the indierence point. Moreover, the sequence xkg is bounded from below
by 0 + F 1g
 
p

.
By induction, the sequence xkg is non-increasing: Notice that x
1
g  x0g. Suppose xkg  xk 1g
for all g. Then a^(;xk)  a^(;xk 1). Hence, Ug
 
x;xk
  Ug  x;xk 1 and the root of
Ug
 
x;xk

does not exceed the root of Ug
 
x;xk 1

.
VOL. VOLUME NO. ISSUE WHO MATTERS IN COORDINATION PROBLEMS? 5
Also by induction, investing is serially dominant for all types (x; g) with x > xkg , for any
k. Assume the statement holds for k. Then a^
 
;xk

is a lower bound on the aggregate
action under any prole that survives k iterations of deletion of dominated strategies and
hence, investing is serially dominant for all (x; g) with x exceeding the root of Ug
 
x;xk

.
The non-increasing, bounded sequence xkg has a limit denoted by xg. For each k,
Ug
 
xk+1g ;x
k

= 0 by the denition of the sequence. Function Ug is continuous and hence
the limit thresholds satisfy the indierence conditions: Ug (xg;x) = 0 for all g.
By the symmetric argument, there exists a vector of thresholds x such that investing
is serially dominated for all types (x; g) with x < xg, and x satises the indierence
conditions, Ug
 
xg;x

= 0. Lemma 5 establishes that there exists a unique x satisfying
the indierence conditions. Hence x = x = x.
When x satises the indierence conditions then the threshold strategy prole dened
by x constitutes a Bayes-Nash equilibrium, because the incentive to invest, Ug (x;x) is
non-decreasing in x. No other equilibria exist because investing is serially dominant above,
and serially dominated below the thresholds.
A3. Equilibrium Convergence
We now establish equilibrium convergence as  ! 0 under Assumptions 0-3 and one
additional assumption:
Assumption 4: The functions ug(a; ) and ug(a; ) are Lipschitz continuous in .
Again, Assumptions 0-4 are satised in the baseline setup with step-like payos.
Recall that 1 = 0 by denition so that  can be identied with a (G  1)-dimensional
vector.
Lemma 7. As  ! 0, the thresholds, xg(), of all groups converge to a common critical
fundamental, , while the relative positions of thresholds,
 
xg()  x1()

=, converge to
some g, for each group. The G variables  and 2; : : : ;G are the unique solution of
the system of G limit indierence conditionsZ 1
0
ug(a; 
)dAg (a;) = 0, for all g;
where the strategic beliefs Ag (a;
) are dened by (7) in the main text.
Proof of Lemma 7. We rst establish that (x1();()) lies in a compact set S, uniformly
across all  2 (0; 1]. All critical types xg lie in =2-neighborhood of the critical fundamental
(); otherwise the critical type would know the outcome of the project and thus violate
the indierence condition. Thus g 2 [ 1; 1] for all g. Finally, x1() is bounded as well;
for all  2 (0; 1], x1() 2

F 10 (p); 1 + F
 1
0 (p)
  [ 1=2; 3=2].
Next, we establish that, when  is small, the indierence conditions, Hg (x1;) = 0,
are well approximated by the limit conditions, H0g (x1;) = 0. We prove that H

g (x1;)
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converges uniformly to H0g (x1;) on R [ 1; 1]G 1:
jHg (x1;) H0g (x1;)j 
Z 1
0
jug(a; x1 + #(a;))  ug(a; x1)j dAg(a;):
We decompose the dierence ug(a; x1 + #(a;))  ug(a; x1) into two parts:
jug(a; x1 + #(a;))  ug(a; x1)j  c1;
where c1 is a positive constant, because ug is Lipschitz continuous and # is bounded (as all
thresholds lie in the =2-neighborhood of ()); similarly for ug. Additionally, ug(a; x1 +
#(a;)) and ug(a; x1) may dier because the events of success a  1   (x1 + #(a;)),
and a  1 x1, respectively, arise for dierent sets of a in the two cases. Denote by R(a; )
the outcome function; R(a; ) = 1 if a  1  , and 0 otherwise.Z 1
0
jR(a; x1 + #(a;)) R(a; x1)j dAg(a;)  c2
for some positive c2 because the derivative of Ag(a) is bounded by 1=(wgmg) from above
and # is bounded. Altogether jHg (x1;) H0g (x1;)j  (c1 + c2b).
Let  and  denote the solution of the indierence conditions H0g (x1;) = 0. Given
any neighborhood N of (;), function H0g (x1;) is uniformly bounded from 0 by some
 on S n N . Choosing  such that Hg (x1;) H0g (x1;) <  on S for all  < , the
system of equations Hg (x1;) = 0 has no solution outside of N .
A4. Equilibrium Characterization
Finally, we characterize the critical state  in the limit, as  ! 0. We impose an
additional assumption that restricts the extent of heterogeneity of investment incentives.
It states that the incentive to invest varies with a homogeneously across the groups, up to
a scale factor ().
Assumption 5: There exists a function u(a; ) and positive functions g(), g() such
that ug(a; ) = g()u(a; )  g() for all groups g.
Proposition 3. If Assumptions 0-5 hold then, for each , the coordination game has a
unique Bayes-Nash equilibrium, in which players use threshold strategies. As  ! 0 all
thresholds xg converge to a common limit , which is the unique solution of
(A7)
Z 1
0
u(a; )da =
X
g
wgmg
g(
)
g()
:
Proposition 1 in the main text is a special case of Proposition 3.
VOL. VOLUME NO. ISSUE WHO MATTERS IN COORDINATION PROBLEMS? 7
Proof of Proposition 3. Lemmas 6 and 7 state that, as  ! 0, thresholds xg() converge
to  that solves
g(
)
Z 1
0
u(a; )dAg(a;)  g() = 0;
for all g. Rearranging, multiplying by wgmg, and summing through g givesZ 1
0
u(a; )d
 X
g
wgmgAg(a;
)
!
=
X
g
wgmg
g(
)
g()
:
This further simplies into (A7) because
P
g wgmgAg(a;
) = a by the belief constraint.
Optimal Subsidy Scheme with General Payoffs
In Section IV of the main text, we solved the planner's problem for the simple step-like
payo functions of the baseline model. Here, we extend the solution to the general payos
specied in (A1). For simplicity, we restrict attention to the case of only two groups.
As in Section IV, the planner species subsidies sg  0, which change the payo for
investing from ug(a; ) to ug(a; ) + sg. We focus on limited subsidies that do not make
investing dominant: recall that ug is bounded from above by  c; the planner chooses
subsidies sg 2 [0; c). The planner chooses  so that there exists a feasible scheme s
implementing , and she solves the expenditure minimization problem (11) in the main
text.
Proposition 4. Assume that the population of players consists of two groups, and that
A0-4 hold. Suppose u1(a; )=w1 is less steep than u2(a; )=w2 with respect to a. That is,
u2(a; )=w2   u1(a; )=w1 is non-decreasing in a, and strictly increasing for some range of
a. Then the optimal policy solving problem (11) exclusively subsidizes group 1.
The proposition does not rely on the relatively restrictive assumption A5 and thus holds
even beyond the class of payos for which we derived the explicit equilibrium characteri-
zation.
Proof of Proposition 4. We consider scheme (s1; s2) with s2 > 0 and nd non-negative
(s01; s02) with s02 < s2 implementing the same critical fundamental as (s1; s2), but with lower
expenditures,
P
gmgs
0
g <
P
gmgsg.
The threshold types satisfy the indierence conditions under both schemes:Z 1
0
ug(a; 
)dAg(a;) + sg = 0 =
Z 1
0
ug(a; 
)dAg(a;0) + s0g:
Multiplying the indierence conditions by mg, summing through g, and rearranging, we
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relate the dierence in subsidy expenditures to the dierence in beliefs:
(B1)
X
g
mg(sg   s0g) =
X
g
Z 1
0
ug(a; 
)
wg
mgwgd
 
Ag(a;
0) Ag(a;)

:
The central step of the proof relies on the belief constraint. It implies that any (weighted)
change of beliefs of group 2 equals the opposite (weighted) change of beliefs of group 1:
m2w2
 
A2(a;
0) A2(a;)

= m1w1
 
A1(a;) A1(a;0)

:
Combining this with (B1) gives
X
g
mg(sg   s0g) = m2w2
Z 1
0
u2(a; )
w2
  u1(a; 
)
w1

d
 
A2(a;
0) A2(a;)

:
By assumption, u2(a; 
)=w2 u1(a; )=w1 is non-decreasing in a, and strictly increasing
for some range of a, and so to prove that
P
gmgsg >
P
gmgs
0
g it suces to show that
A2(a;
0) rst-order stochastically dominates A2(a;).
Notice from (7) that the strategic beliefs are monotone functions of 2 and hence
A2(a;) and A2(a;
0) are ordered by stochastic dominance. The subsidy s02 < s2 and thus,
to keep the threshold type (x2; 2) indierent, her belief A2(a;0) must indeed stochastically
dominate A2(a;).
Critical State for Targeted Deposit Freeze in Section VI.A
Let ag be proportion of group g that decides not to withdraw. Then the aggregate volume
of the deposits kept in the bank (voluntarily or involuntarily) is a =
P
gmg [1  qg + qgag].
Given the modied denition of the aggregate action a, the belief constraint in this situation
is amended as follows. Let Ag(a) be the belief (c.d.f.) over a of the critical type from group
g. Then, for a 2
hP
gmg(1  qg); 1
i
,X
g
mgqgAg(a) = a 
X
g
mg(1  qg):
Recall that pg = 1 Ag(1  ) is the success probability as evaluated by the critical type
of group g. ThusX
g
mgqgpg =
X
g
mgqg (1 Ag(1  )) =
X
g
mgqg   (1  ) +
X
g
mg(1  qg) = :
As before, the indierence conditions imply that the success probabilities are pg = cg=bg.
Thus, the critical state is  =
P
gmgqgcg=bg.
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